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This paper presents an application of the Urban and Lambert “upgraded-AJL Decomposition” approach
that was designed to deal with the problem of close-income equals in equity analysis, and as applied to
the area of health care ﬁnance. Contrary to most previous studies, vertical and horizontal inequities and
the triple effects of inter-groups, intra-group and entire-group reranking of various ﬁnancing schemes are
estimated, with statistical signiﬁcance calculated using the bootstrap method. Application is made on the
three ﬁnancing schemes present in the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Results demonstrate
the relative importance of the three forms of reranking in determining overall inequality. The paper offers
policy recommendations to limit the existing inequalities in the system and to enhance the capacity of
the governmental insurance scheme.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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. Introduction
Assessing the impact ofhealth careﬁnanceon income inequality
s a relatively newarea of analysis in the context of both developing
nd developed countries (Wagstaff, 2002). Worldwide empirical
vidence has already shown that different health care ﬁnancing
chemes may very differently affect the prevailing income dis-
ribution of a country, and consequently, the associated level of
verall income inequality (van Doorslaer et al., 1999; Wagstaff,
002). The distributional impact of health care ﬁnancing can be
nferred frommeasures of vertical inequity; e.g., progressivity anal-
sis. However, as stated by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1997):
dependingon the extent of horizontal inequity and reranking involved
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ax: +972 2 298 2963.
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oi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.09.005n health care ﬁnance, a progressivity analysis can give a mislead-
ng impression about the income redistribution associated with the
nancing system”. These three dimensions of inequity – relating
espectively to violations of the normative principles of “unequal
reatment of unequals”, “equal treatment of equals” and “proper
reatment of unequals” – are generally addressed by decomposing
he redistributive effect (RE) induced by ﬁnancing into a verti-
al, horizontal and reranking effect (Aronson and Lambert, 1994).
pplied to health care ﬁnance, the vertical effect (VE) measures
ow and to what extent individuals of unequal ability-to-pay are
ffected by the ﬁnancing, the horizontal effect (HE) captures the
xtent to which individuals of equal ability-to-pay make unequal
ontributions to health care, whereas the reranking (RR) quanti-
es changes in ranking-order of individuals (by income) following
ealth payments (O’Donnell et al., 2007).
Empirical studies conducted in the context of developed coun-
ries (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1997; van Doorslaer et al., 1999)
ave demonstrated that different forms of health care ﬁnancing
ay indeed be associated with both horizontal and reranking
ffects. This is even more likely in the context of developing
ountries,where incomeprotectionmechanismsare still far under-
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eveloped (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2005; Pauly et al., 2006), and
here high proportions of health care expenditures are funded by
ouseholds’ direct out-of-pocket payments (Musgrove et al., 2002).
ince illness is a stochastic event, the extent of discrepancies in
ctual payments born by individuals belonging to a similar income
roup, as well as the extent of changes in income status of indi-
iduals due to “catastrophic” health care payments, is likely to be
xacerbated in these countries (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003;
u et al., 2003; Ichoku, 2005).
A simultaneous assessment of the above three different mea-
ures of inequity may therefore be of particular interest to fully
eveal the overall RE of health care ﬁnancing in the context of
eveloping countries. Such assessment can indeed help inform the
ontroversial policy debates about the extent to which reforms
imed at increasing the efﬁciency of health care systems do not
imultaneously increase inequities in health care ﬁnancing. This
ay in turn help reduce the possible adverse effects of health
are ﬁnancing on the prevailing income inequalities in a country
Kidson, 1999; McPake and Mills, 2000; James et al., 2006).
The literature on public ﬁnance offers variousmethods to quan-
itatively measure VE, HE and RR (e.g., Kakwani, 1984; Aronson et
l., 1994; Ven et al., 2001; Duclos et al., 2003). The approach that
as been previously applied in the speciﬁc domain of health care
nancing (Wagstaff andDoorslaer, 1997; vanDoorslaer et al., 1999)
s the one initially proposed by Aronson et al. (1994)—hereafter
he AJL approach. Theoretically, the AJL approach allows to decom-
ose the total RE of a ﬁnancing scheme into VE, HE and RR for a
opulation that is composed of groups of true- or exact-income
quals, i.e., a situation where the study sample consists of groups
f individuals having exactly the same pre-payment income, and
or a distribution where the average post-payment income of each
roup increaseswith the respective pre-payment income level, i.e.,
payment schedule that is supposed not to produce changes in
he groups’ ranking-order. However, due to the absence of exact-
ncome equals in real data surveys, empirical implementations
f the AJL approach have relied on the principle of close-income
quals, i.e., by dividing the study sample into artiﬁcial groups of
ncome based on certain deﬁnitions of income bandwidths. It has
eenshownthat suchpractice can lead tomisleading results: biases
ayarisenotonlydue to thearbitrary speciﬁcationof close-income
quals, but also due, in large part, to the possibility of both intra-
roups reranking – i.e. the extent to which the payment schedule
nduces changes in ranking-order of individuals within the spec-
ﬁed groups of close-income equals (RWG) – and entire-groups
eranking, i.e., the extent to which the payment schedule induces
hanges in ranking-order of the whole groups of close-income
quals (REG) (Ven et al., 2001).
The need to consider the potential impact of RWG and REG, as
ell as the sensitivity of the empirical estimations of VE and HE to
he choice of income bandwidth for close-equals, has been advo-
ated for the assessment of RE of tax and transfer systems (Ven et
l., 2001; Urban and Lambert, 2008). These aspects may also be rel-
vant with regard to the assessment of RE of different health care
nancing schemes. A methodological extension to the earlier work
n tax literature has latterly been provided by Urban and Lambert
2008)—hereafter the UL approach. In contrast to the classical AJL
pproach and its previous applications, the UL approach reset the
easurement system of VE, HE and RR using a conceptual model
hat is speciﬁcally designed to accommodate close-income equals
etting. The UL approach presents two complementary advan-
ages: it is able to capture all possible reranking effects, and it
rovides a more convenient identiﬁcation of vertical and horizon-
al inequities by smoothing the actual effect of payments within
ach close-income equals group. In such approach, the VE is mea-
ured by allocating to each individual the average payment paid
(
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y the respective group of close-income equals, while HE is esti-
ated directly based on person-by-person comparisons of actual
nd counterfactual; i.e., smoothed, post-payment incomes within
lose-equals groups. Lastly, although there is no consensus in the
mpirical literature on an optimal procedure to identify the income
andwidth of close-equals (Ven et al., 2001; Duclos et al., 2003),
he UL approach, while computationally involves direct estimates
f VE, HE, and RR as sample statistics, advocates an assessment
f the relative importance of these effects given different choices
f income bandwidth. This may, indeed, facilitate an appropriate
peciﬁcation of close-income groups for policy purpose. The UL
pproachhas been recently applied to investigate theREof taxation
n the USA (Kim and Lambert, 2009). However, to our knowledge,
here has been no previous attempt to apply such methodological
mprovement in the speciﬁc area of health care ﬁnancing.
Another limitationofpreviousworkon inequalitymeasurement
n health care ﬁnance, which may also fuel unnecessary misinter-
retations, is related to the fact that most of the previous studies
ave rarely assessed the statistical signiﬁcance of inequality mea-
ures. The very few studies (Klavus, 2001; Cissé et al., 2007) that
ave attempted todo sohaveused the classical asymptoticmethod,
hich has its own limitations (Mills and Zandvakili, 1997). How-
ver, statistical inference based on bootstrap methods were shown
o lead to more subtle treatment for statistical problems associ-
ted with the measures of inequality (Andres and Calonge, 2005;
oran, 2006). The bootstrap method takes into account the spe-
iﬁc bounds of inequalitymeasureswhile nounderlying function of
istribution is being imposed. Besides comparing standard errors
nd probability intervals, an obvious advantage of the bootstrap
ethod is that it allows for testing the relationship between two
nterdependent curves according to the dominance criterion, and
herefore, reduces the risk of biased interpretations due to sample
tructure (Davidson and Flachaire, 2007; Abu-Zaineh et al., 2008).
The purpose of this paper is to apply the above methodolog-
cal advances initially developed for inequality measurement of
axation to the speciﬁc domain of health care ﬁnancing, and to
llustrate how these developments can signiﬁcantly help clarify-
ng debates about health care policies in the context of developing
ountries, using the particular case of the Occupied Palestinian
erritory (OPT). The ﬁnancing structure of health care in the OPT
s expected to be associated with a major risk of exacerbation of
nequalities: the country lacks a universal system of health care
nancing and a substantial share of health care expenditures is
unded through households’ direct out-of-pocket payments PCBS,
004. The main public ﬁnancing scheme is the one known as the
overnmental Health Insurance (GHI). Initially, this was on a com-
ulsory basis for public sector employees. However, the scheme
as been opened up to others – in the private and informal sectors
on a voluntary basis. By 2002, over 60% of the Palestinian house-
olds were covered by public scheme, a little less than half of these
eing covered on a voluntary basis (MoH-PHIC, 2006). On the other
and, the ongoing political crisis in the region, which has brutally
ncreased the proportion of the population living under the poverty
ine (PCBS, 2006b), tends to aggravate existing inequities in access
o health care (Mataria et al., 2006). Consequently, the Ministry
f Health has started to provide an almost free of charge cover-
ge to the mostly affected classes of the population. This insurance
cheme was lately known as “Al-Aqsa Intifada Insurance”. How-
ver, the indigent performance of the local economy, the freeze
f ﬁnancial support and tax transfers to the Palestinian Authority
PA) threaten to negatively affect the current health care delivery
ystem. Furthermore, due to the lack of effective and sufﬁcient
edistributive polices (e.g., proper system of tax transfer), which
ay help reduce inequality and ensure more equitable distribu-
ion of income, the redistributive effect of the current health care
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nancing structure are expected to aggravate the global existing
nequality in the prevalent income distribution in the country.
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on data from a
ecent household health expenditure survey, originally designed
or initiating a system of National Health Accounts for the OPT. The
urvey, which was carried out in 2004 by the Palestinian Central
ureau of Statistics PCBS, 2004, covered a national representa-
ive sample of Palestinian households residing in the West Bank
WB) and Gaza Strip (GS). Collected data provide detailed informa-
ion on households’ incomes and expenditures, individuals’ health
are seekingbehaviours, health careexpenditures, andgovernment
nd private insurance premiums. Consequently, the survey offers
unique opportunity to assess some equity features of health care
nancing, and to discuss the extent to which recent developments
n inequalitymeasurement, and its statistical inference,may add to
ur understanding of equity issues in the Palestinian context. Some
f the methodological developments that we try to transfer to the
eld of equity measurement in the case of health care ﬁnancing in
he OPT may also be worthwhile for other contexts in developing
ountries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
iscuses some methodological issues in measuring and decom-
osing the total RE into VE, HE, and RR, using the measurement
pproach proposed by Urban and Lambert (2008); this is followed
y describing the estimation procedures and statistical inferences
or inequality measures. Section 3 describes our data and variables
eﬁnitions used for the empirical analysis. Results are reported in
ection 4. The last two sections contain our discussion and conclu-
ions.
. Methodology
.1. Measurement model
Total RE of health care payments can be deﬁned as the
dis)equalizing effect associated with a move from pre- to post-
ayment income distributions (Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977).
hus, if Gx and Gy are pre- and post-payment Gini coefﬁcients,
espectively, then RE can be assessed as:
E = Gx − Gy (1)
A positive (negative) value of RE indicates that health payments
end to reduce (exacerbate) income inequality; and thus, the pay-
ent scheme is qualiﬁed as “pro-poor” (“pro-rich”). Segregating
E into VE, HE, and RR – as suggested by Urban and Lambert (2008)
necessitates the estimation of a set of concentration coefﬁcients
or post-payment income distribution, Cy, each corresponds to a
articular ordering of income units as per groups of close-income
quals,˝w
k
(k taking thevalues form1 toK,withKbeing thenumber
f groups as determinedby the incomebandwidth,w, and themax-
mum income in the sample). Consequently, RE can be decomposed
s follows:
E = VE − HE − RR (2)
TheVE component,whichmeasures the counterfactual inequal-
ty change that would arise should horizontal equity in payments
revail, can then be assessed as follows:
E = GxC1y (3)here C1y is the post-payment income concentration coefﬁcient
hat would be obtained if each x∈˝w
k
is reduced by g,k—where
g,k is the mean payment of health care of the group k.
HE, which measures the pure horizontal inequity, is assessed
y comparing person-by-person departures of the actual post-
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ayment incomes from those generated by a reference schedule
onstructed, counterfactually, to be horizontal inequality-free
ithin groups of close-equals,
E = C2y − C1y (4)
here C2y is the post-payment income concentration coefﬁcient
hat is obtained by ranking households by their pre-payment
ncomes. Finally, RR, which measures the reranking that occurs in
he transition from pre-payment to post-payment income period,
s conceptualized to incorporate three forms of rank reversals:RWG,
EG, and RBG. These are related as follows:
R = RWG + RBG + REG = [C3y − C2y ] + [C4y − C3y ]
+[Gy − C4y ] = Gy − C2y (5)
here C3y is obtained by ranking householdswithin groups by post-
ayment incomes, and the groups by their pre-payment group
eans, x,k; whereas C4y is obtained by ranking households within
roups by post-payment incomes and the groups by post-payment
roup means, y,k.
It is important to note that each form of reranking corresponds
o a different change in the order of income distribution and
ndicates different possible causes. The presence of “differential
reatment of equals” per se can induce reranking (Wagstaff and
oorslaer, 1997). For instance, risk-rating premiums can cause
oth horizontal inequality and reranking. Such form of reranking
an be detected by the term RWG, which measures rank reversals
ithin groups. Reranking can also arise in the absence of horizontal
nequality. For instance, a ﬂat-rate premium induces no horizontal
nequality, though such (highly regressive) payment schedule can
nduce changes in ranking-order of the whole groups, hence the
erm REG. Lastly, reranking can occurwhenmarginal payment rates
xceed unity in some parts of income distribution. For instance,
his can be due to catastrophic health payments, which lead to
erankingbetween-groups (RBG). This formof reranking showshow
ouseholdswithdifferent incomes are affectedbyhealthﬁnancing.
.2. Statistical inference of inequality measures
Statistical signiﬁcance of observed variations in the computed
aluesof eachof theabovemeasureswas testedusing thebootstrap
ethod (BTS). BTS is a re-sampling method used to simulate the
mpirical distribution of a statistic (Effron and Tibshirani, 1993).
he same method is used to evaluate the null hypothesis of no
hange between the two periods (e.g., pre-payment and post-
ayment periods). The applications of BTS for inequality measures
re described and documented in Duclos and Araar (2006), and
ndres and Calonge (2005). However, to illustrate the use of the
TS methods for the measures in the present paper, we brieﬂy
escribe the implemented procedures for the case of Gini coefﬁ-
ients denoted as G.
Consider a statistic Gˆ based on a sample size N; hence, instead
f assuming the shape of the distribution of Gˆ statistic, the entire
ampling distribution of Gˆ is approximated through investigat-
ng its variation over a large number of pseudo-samples obtained
y randomly selecting, with replacement, a large number (R) of
ub-samples of size n (n<N), out of the same dataset—the BTS re-
amples. The statistic Gˆ is then computed for each BTS re-sample,
ielding Gˆ*—theso-calledBTS replicationof the statistic Gˆ. The sam-
ling variation of Gˆ can be estimated by applying the expression of
tandard errors to the R-length vector of BTS replications. Regard-
ng the estimation of the probability conﬁdence intervals [GˆI, GˆS] at
conﬁdence level of (1−˛)%, BTS provides us with different pos-
ible methods to construct tail probabilities for the statistic Gˆ; e.g.,
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health care. The total household income – as reﬂected by the total
household expenditure – is then annualized and divided by the
equivalence factor to generate an adjusted income per equivalent-
adult.074 M. Abu-Zaineh et al. / Journal of H
he percentile method (Mills and Zandvakili, 1997). The latter pro-
edure involves an estimation of an empirical function f(R´) of the
tatistic of interest (G) from R of BTS re-samples. The empirical per-
entiles (˛/2) and (1−˛/2) can, then, be computed for a signiﬁcance
evel (˛).
Using the underlying relationship between conﬁdence intervals
ndhypothesis testing, tail probabilityvalues forhypothesis testing
an be computed from the BTS distribution. Sincewe are interested
n comparing different values of an inequality measures such as
he difference between pre-payment and post-payment Gini coef-
cients, we adopt the following tests: let V1 and V2 be vectors of
TS values of measure (G) in the periods 1 and 2, for instance,
re-payment income and post-payment income measured over
he same households in a particular year, then D=V2 −V1. The test
ejects the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients for the two periods
re the same; i.e., the equality betweencoefﬁcients, if the estimated
onﬁdence interval for the difference of the Gini coefﬁcients does
ot include zero. This can be formulated as follows: H0: G1 =G2
gainst HA: G1 /= G2 which can be re-deﬁned as H0: D=0 against
A:D /= 0.Previousauthorshavesuggested thatR shouldbeat least
00 in order to obtain estimates signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Duclos
nd Araar, 2006). In this paper we simulate 200 re-samples with
eplacements to estimate the BTS standard errors and the tail prob-
bility intervals at ˛=5%. Of course, one can allow the sample size
f BTS to vary and then to examine the effects of such variation on
ur measures of dispersion. However, this exercise is beyond the
bjective of this paper.
.3. Estimation procedures
The computation of inequality measures – deﬁned above –
an be conducted using either the convenient covariance methods
Jenkins, 1988) or the integration methods available in software
rograms such asGAUSS, Stata andDAD (vanDoorslaer et al., 1999;
uclos and Araar, 2006). However, in this paper, we have chosen
o use purpose-built procedures in MATLAB software program. In
ase where household is the unit of observation, one has to adjust
or differences in the demographic composition of the household
n order to generate individual-level estimates. Among the several
ays to do so (Lambert, 2003; Muellbauer and Ven, 2003), we used
he WHO/FAO equivalence scale, suggested for the case of devel-
ping countries (Cissé et al., 2007). This assigns a value of 1 for an
dult man, 0.8 for an adult woman, and 0.5 for children younger
han 15 years old (Aho et al., 1997). Household level of resources is
hen divided by the equivalence factor, zi, to generate an adjusted
ncome per equivalent-adult.
The different inequality coefﬁcients are estimated using the fol-
owing formula (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1989; Kim and Lambert,
009):
=
2cov
(
Wh
(∑h
i=1wizi/N
))

=
(2/N)
∑n
h=1whzh(Wh − )
((∑
here Wh is household h income per equivalent adult (h taking the
alues form 1 to n), n is the total number of sample observations,
is the total number of equivalent adults, N =
∑n
h=1whzh, and 
s the mean income overall.
The computations of RE and RRmeasures are independent of the
hoice of incomebandwidth (w). As forVE,HE, and the various com-
onents of reranking (RBG,RWG,REG), an incomebandwidthmust be
eﬁned in order to construct groups of close-income equals. Since
here are different methods to specify income bandwidth of close-
quals (e.g., Ven et al., 2001; Wagstaff, 2002; Duclos et al., 2003),
nd since the relative importance of decomposition components
re shown to be sensitive to different deﬁnitions of income band-
i
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izi/N
)
− (1/N2)
∑n
h=1
∑h
i=1wizi
)
(6)
idth (Aronson et al., 1994; Urban and Lambert, 2008), we used
n annual income interval ranging from 250 New Israeli Shekel
NIS) to 15,000 NIS2 to assess the sensitivity of the results to alter-
ative groupings of income bandwidth. A bandwidth of 500 NIS
being around 12.5% of the mode value of pre-payment income
ector (x) in the study sample – is then, picked up for the ini-
ial results.3 Having selected a bandwidth for close-income equals,
he decomposition components are computed directly as a sam-
le statistic—each according to the measurement system speciﬁed
bove.
. Data, variables deﬁnitions
The Palestinian Household Health Expenditure Survey PCBS,
004 is a two-stage stratiﬁed cluster-random sample of 4496
alestinian households. For the purpose of this paper, the house-
old is taken as the unit of analysis. After the process of deleting
he cases with missing relevant information, the WB sub-sample
ontained 2504 households and GS sub-sample contained 1322
ouseholds. The data have been weighted to compensate for non-
esponse and to recover the population proﬁle as per the OPT
opulation Census of 1997. The survey questionnaire included
nformation about household’s recent health experiences – uti-
ization and expenditures – during the last month preceding the
urvey. The questionnaire starts by gathering information about
he nature of the health problem(s) – if any – including: acute,
hronic, injury/accident, dental and/or psychological. Respondents
ere then asked about the number of visits made to the health
are provider, spectrum of service(s) received during the visit,
nd about all direct and indirect health expenditures resulting
rom this episode, including: transportation and any other related
xpenses, and cost sharing by other stakeholders. Socioeconomic
haracteristics of households were also collected, including: num-
er of household’s members, household mean monthly income
nd expenditures, household expenditures on the various health
are services and on insurance premiums; as well as individual
espondents’ age, sex, education, marital status, occupation and
mployment status, type of housing (Urban, Rural, and Camp) and
egion (West Bank, Gaza Strip) of residence.
The direct measures of living standards available from the sur-
ey are household mean monthly income and household mean
onthly expenditures. As the later was judged by PCBS (2004) to
e more accurate and deﬁnitely a better measure of households’
ncomes we used this variable as a measure of households’ living
standards. This choice is coherent with current experience
f data collection in developing countries (Deaton and Grosh,
000). Therefore, household pre-payment income variable (x)
s apprehended through the total household expenditure, gross
f payments for health care, while household post-payment
ncome is pre-payment income, so deﬁned, net of payment for2 At the time of the study 1 NIS was equivalent to 0.23 US$.
3 This is in line with the optimal bandwidth suggested by van de Ven et al. (2001)
n which they advocate a bandwidth that maximizes the vertical contribution of the
E.
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Payments for health care were computed for three sources of
ealth care ﬁnancing: direct out-of-pocket payments, GHI, and
rivate health insurance (PHI) schemes.4 As for out-of-pocket pay-
ents, they represent total actual spending, directly and indirectly,
aid by the patient in exchange of services offered by governmen-
al, non-governmental, UNRWA and private health care providers.
ata on health care spending was gathered by questioning each
ousehold about its monthly expenditures on 25 separate health
are items, including: consultation fees, laboratory tests, medica-
ions (counting for auto-medication), expenditures on traditional
ealers, transportation costs, and any other related health expen-
itures. On the other hand, GHI and PHI premiums have been
ecorded, and were included, in the estimation of household total
ealth expenditures. As for income, total health expenditureswere
nnualized and equivalised using the aforementioned equivalence
cale.
. Results
.1. Principal decomposition results
Table 1 presents the UL decomposition of the redistributive
ffects for each, and all source(s) of health care ﬁnancing in the WB
ndGS, alongwith the corresponding values of BTS standard errors
nd 95% BTS conﬁdence intervals. It can ﬁrst be noted that among
heprincipalﬁnancing sourcesout-of-pocketpayments causea sta-
istically signiﬁcantly negative RE (−0.0370 and −0.0247 in theWB
ndGS, respectively).Directﬁnancing is thus “pro-rich” in the sense
hat payments increase inequality in the post-payment incomedis-
ributions compared to pre-payment ones. By contrast, GHI and
HI schemes appear to be “pro-poor” in their redistributive effects,
s reﬂected by the positive values of RE in both regions. Table 1
hows, however, that the magnitudes of RE associated with the
wo schemes are quite marginal (0.0007 and 0.0001 for GHI and
HI, respectively), and statistically insigniﬁcant (at ˛=0.05). As a
esult, health careﬁnancing remainsoverall signiﬁcantly “pro-rich”
ith RE of −0.0379 and −0.0254 in the WB and GS, respectively.
uch results exhibit a signiﬁcant increase in inequality induced by
he current ﬁnancing system in the two Palestinian regions.
The contributions of VE, HE, and RR to income inequality can
e better reﬂected by expressing them as a percentage of the
otal RE (Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 1997). In the case of out-of-
ocket payments the values of VE (−0.0158) and (−0.0084) would
ccount for 42.7% and 34.9% of the total “pro-rich” RE in the
B and GS, respectively. This indicates that the majority of the
ncome inequality generated by such ﬁnancing modality is due
o both HE and RR. As for GHI, the estimated values of VE, which
merge to be signiﬁcantly positive in the two regions, would
ccount for 172.1% and 148.4% of the total “pro-poor” RE in the
B and GS, respectively; indicating that GHI would have been
2.1% and 48.4% more “pro-poor” redistributive if there had been
o HE and RR. Turning to PHI, the value of VE would account
or 128.5% and 113.6% of the total “pro-poor” RE in the WB and
S, respectively; indicating that the PHI scheme would have been
ore redistributive by 28.5% and 13.6% in the absence of both
E and RR. However, the positive values of VE of private insur-
nce prove to be rather indeterminate and statistically insigniﬁcant
at ˛=0.05).
4 Since the health expenditure survey did not provide any information on taxes, it
as impossible to estimate the amount thatwouldhavebeenpaid in taxes for health
are by a given household. Therefore, the analysis was conﬁned to three sources of
nancing which are considered to be the major sources of health care ﬁnancing in
he context of the Palestinian health care system. Ta
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Fig. 1. VE of out-of-pocket payments versus income bandwidth.
Fig. 2. VE of GHI versus income bandwidth.
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These results suggest that despite the importance of vertical
ifferences (progressivity or regressivity) in the income redistribu-
ion induced by the ﬁnancing system, there is a fairly high degree
f HE and RR associated with each source of ﬁnancing. Table 1
hows, however, that there are considerable variations in the rel-
tive importance of these two effects in generating more income
nequality. Unexpectedly, the value of HE of (0.0006) in the case
f out-of-pocket payments appears to account for only less than
2.5% of the total “pro-rich” RE in the two Palestinian regions.5
his indicates that horizontal differences are responsible for only a
uite small amount of the total “pro-rich” RE associated with out-
f-pocket payment, and therefore, the total RE induced by direct
ayment for health care would have been marginally less “pro-
ich” redistributive in the absence of horizontal inequity. In the
ase of GHI, the values of HE appear to be more important and
learly reduce the redistributive “pro-poor” effect of this scheme
ompared to what it would have been in the absence of horizontal
nequity by about 5.5% and 11.2% in the WB and GS, respectively.
y contrast, the value of HE for PHI is rather small and accounts
or only 1.4% in the WB and 3.2% GS of the total RE. By considering,
astly, the overall health care payment, the contributions of HE to
he total “pro-rich” RE, remains fairly small, being about −1.6% and
2.8% in the WB and GS, respectively.
These results indicate that the majority of the “additional”
ncrease in the income inequality that is not due to “pure” verti-
al and horizontal inequities is due to reranking (RR). Indeed, in
he two cases: the regressive out-of-pocket payments and the pro-
ressive GHI, RR appears to be responsible for the largest amount
f additional variation in the RE. As shown in Table 1, our method-
logical approach further decomposes the total reranking (RR) into
hree components: RWG, REG and RBG. This decomposition is use-
ul to ascertain the sources of reranking and the contribution of
ach of them in the total RE. By so doing, the inter-group rerank-
ng (RBG) emerges to be responsible for the majority of the total
eranking induced by out-of-pocket payments and by the total
ealth care payment, and would alone account for about half of
he increase in the income inequality in the two regions. On the
ther hand, intra-group reranking (RWG) would account for −6.5%
nd about −12.1% of the additional increase in RE in the WB and
S, respectively. The contribution of entire-group reranking (REG)
s quite small and would slightly increase the regressive RE of out-
f-pocket payments (by less than 1.0%) in both regions. In the case
f GHI, the relative importance of the RBG and RWG are signiﬁcantly
ifferent between the two regions: in the WB the RBG appears to
e responsible for the majority of the decrease in the “pro-poor”
E (42.3%) compared to (24.2%) attributed to RWG, whereas in GS
he majority of reranking-induced decrease is attributed to RWG
20.2%) compared to (17.0%) due to RBG. Regarding PHI scheme, the
WG constitutes the largest share of reranking-induced decrease in
E, whilst RBG comes in the second place. Lastly, in the two regions
nd for the two schemes, the REG remains zero.
.2. Sensitivity of decomposition results to income bandwidth
The results presented in the above section highlight the relative
mportance of the vertical and horizontal inequities, as well as that
f the different forms of reranking, in the total variation of income
nequality (RE) for an income bandwidth (w) of 500 NIS. The con-
entration coefﬁcients Cy – used to decompose the total RE – are
ivariate measures of inequality—i.e., they measure inequality in
5 Note that HE appears to be negative when expressed as a percentage of RE since
he out-of-pocket is a regressive source of ﬁnancing, and therefore HE increases the
E in absolute term.
o
t
t
R
p
(
d
–Fig. 3. HE of out-of-pocket payments versus income bandwidth.
ne variable; e.g., post-payment income (y), in relation to ranking
f another; e.g., pre-payment income (x) (Koolman and Doorslaer,
004). Since the ranking is variant with respect to the deﬁnition
f w, changing the size of w – used to group x – is likely to affect
he relative magnitudes of the VE, HE, as well as the relative con-
ributions of each of the three reranking components, RBG, RWG,
EG to the RE. This section explores the sensitivity of the decom-
osition components to different choices of income bandwidths
w).
Results are presented in Figs. 1–6 where the relevant values of
ecomposition components are plotted against a large range of w
where w taking the values from 250 to 15,000 NIS – for both
M. Abu-Zaineh et al. / Journal of Health
Fig. 4. HE of GHI versus income bandwidth.
Fig. 5. RR effects of out-of-pocket versus income bandwidth.
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ut-of-pocket payments and GHI in the case of WB.6 The corre-
ponding BTS conﬁdence intervals at a signiﬁcance level of 95% are
resented as dashed lines along w. Figs. 1 and 2 indicate that the
E in the two cases: the regressive out-of-pocket payments and
he progressive GHI tend to fall as w increases; this clearly implies
ower contributions of VE in the total RE. As shown in Figs. 1 and 2,
he lower and upper bounds of the conﬁdence intervals of VE asso-
iated with out-of-pocket payments are both negative along all
ncomebandwidths,while in the case ofGHI they are positive along
6 Similar analysis was also conducted for GS; however, since the analysis demon-
trates similar magnitudes of the sensitivity of decomposition components to the
hoice of bandwidth, we have chosen to include in this paper the results for the WB
ase only and for two ﬁnancing sources: out-of-pocket payments and GHI premi-
ms.
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ncome bandwidths except for the very large bandwidth where
he lower bound turns to be negative. This indicates that the VE is
lways signiﬁcantly negative (VE<0∀w at ˛=0.05) in case of out-
f-pocket payments, and signiﬁcantly positive (VE>0∀w <8000
IS at ˛=0.05) in the case of GHI.
Results concerningHE, as represented in Figs. 2 and 3, show that
n the case of out-of-pocket payments the values of HE tend to rise
s w increases, suggesting higher contributions of HE in the total
E. The lower and upper bounds of the conﬁdence intervals in this
ase conﬁrm that HE is always signiﬁcantly positive (HE>0∀w at
=0.05). In the case of GHI, the estimated values of HE tend to rise
nd are found to be signiﬁcantly positive only in the small income
andwidths (HE>0∀w <2000 NIS at ˛=0.05). Fig. 3 shows, how-
ver, thatHE turns to be signiﬁcantly large and negative in the large
andwidths (HE<0∀w >2000 NIS at ˛=0.05). Regarding, the rela-
ive importanceofdifferent formsof reranking, Figs. 5 and6suggest
hat the values of RBG and REG get inferior and even approach zero,
hile the values of RWG get larger as the bandwidth increases.
o sum up, the general trend of each decomposition component
ppears as follows: the larger the bandwidth (w) that is used to
onstruct close-income equals, the lesser the contribution of verti-
al effect (VE), the higher the contribution of horizontal effect (HE)
nd within-group reranking (RWG), and lastly, the lesser the contri-
ution of both inter-groups and entire-groups reranking (RBG and
EG) to RE.
. Discussion
This paper has attempted to transfer recent methodological
evelopment in inequality measurement of taxation to the speciﬁc
omain of health care ﬁnancing. The analysis of the redistributive
mpact of health careﬁnancingon theoverall income inequalityhas
een extended beyond the partial analysis of progressivity and the
ommonly usedAJL approach. Amodiﬁed decomposition approach
hat disentangles the total RE of health care payment into vertical,
orizontal and reranking effects has been implemented, using the
easurement model proposed by Urban and Lambert (2008). Such
pproach provides appropriate measures of inequality that can be
ormatively distinct in the context where households’ incomes
re regrouped into close – rather than – exact-income equals,
nd where the actual payments made by households belonging
o these groups may further affect their intra- and entire-group
anking-order. In addition to simultaneously estimate each mea-
ure of inequality as sample statistics, the analysis presented in this
aper has attempted to examine the statistical inference of each
articular measure of inequality using the bootstrap method. Such
ethod provides a basis for assessing the extent of sampling error
ssociated with estimated inequality measures and allows test-
ng statistical signiﬁcance of each of them within the dominance
ramework. The analysis was conducted for the three main health
areﬁnancing schemesproper to thePalestinian context,whichhas
ecently experienced sudden and severe impoverishment effects
mposed by the chronic political crises.
The decomposition analysis clearly conﬁrms that the “differ-
ntial treatments” – as reﬂected by both “unequal treatment of
quals” and “improper treatment of unequals” (HE+RR) – are
ogether fairly more important in determining the degree of the
verall income inequality induced by health care ﬁnancing than
he progressivity (regressivity) contribution that had previously
ttracted the most attention in the literature. Indeed, the effect of
eranking appears to be even more important than the pure hori-
ontal inequity and represent the major factor behind the adverse
ffect on income inequality. The factors underlying the “improper
reatment of unequals” are therefore, of considerable interest. The
ecomposition approach was able to identify sources of reranking
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n termsof inter-, intra- andentire-groups reranking. The latter two
orms of reranking (RWG and REG), that were not explicitly envis-
ged in previous research proved be prevalent sources of reranking
nduced by health care payments. The analysis also reveals a sig-
iﬁcant effect of the pure horizontal inequity – as identiﬁed by
erson-by-person comparisons of actual and counterfactual post-
ayment income distributions – in the overall variation of income
nequality.
The detailed analysis of the impact of different health care
nancing schemes on income inequality reveals even more inter-
sting information. It was shown that the impact of out-of-pocket
ayments on income inequality not only derives from their
egressivity but also from differential treatment due to horizon-
al inequity and reranking. Indeed, horizontal inequity and total
eranking combined were responsible for more than half of the
pro-rich” income redistribution associated with out-of-pocket
ayments. These ﬁgures are far greater than those reported for the
ECD countries by van Doorslaer et al. (1999) – HE and RR were
stimated, using somewhat different deﬁnitions, to be between
and 30% of the total RE – but remain close to others estimated
or Vietnam—61.5% and 70.8% of the total RE in 1993 and 1998,
espectively (Wagstaff, 2002). Quite interestingly, the decomposi-
ion approach shows that the overall reranking effects are more
mportant in terms of their redistributive effect than the vertical
nd horizontal differences. This is again consistent with previous
esults found for out-of-pocket payments in Vietnam (Wagstaff,
002), Nigeria (Ichoku, 2005), and Netherlands (Wagstaff and
an Doorslaer, 1997) even if the extent of RR in the two Pales-
inian regions appears to be higher than in these other countries.
his indicates that in the context of the predominantly “market-
riven” health care ﬁnancing in the OPT, out-of-pocket health care
ayments tend to force households not only to buy health care
isproportionately to their income but also to affect their income
tatus and, therefore, to exacerbate poverty.
Further examination of the sources of reranking reveals that
he so-speciﬁed inter-groups reranking (RBG) is responsible for
he most part of reranking-induced variation in income inequal-
ty associated with out-of-pocket payments (with RBG%=−48.5%
nd −50.7% of the total RE in the WB and GS, respectively). This
ay be due to the stochastic nature of most illnesses, which affects
ouseholds with different income status; resulting for instance,
n richer sick individuals to be overtaken by poorer but healthy
nes. On the other hand, the relatively small value of intra-group
eranking (RWG) compared with inter-groups reranking (RBG) may,
owever, reﬂect quite small disparities in the actual payments
ithin the speciﬁed group of equals. The same is truewhen consid-
ring the disparities between the actual and counterfactual income
istributions. The latter resulted in relatively small values of pure
orizontal inequality, which account for 1.6% and 2.5% of the total
ro-rich RE in the WB and GS, respectively. These ﬁgures appear
o be quite small when compared to those previously obtained for
eveloped countries; e.g., 11.3% for Netherlands (Wagstaff and van
oorslaer, 1997), and developing countries; e.g., 25% for Vietnam
Wagstaff, 2002). It should be noted, however, that some of these
ifferences may reﬂect, in part, the different methodologies used
o account for pure horizontal inequity; in previous studies, hori-
ontal inequity was measured using the AJL approach as a residual
erm (Wagstaff and vanDoorslaer, 1997; vanDoorslaer et al., 1999;
agstaff, 2002). It is, as noted earlier, where the AJL approach is
pplied to close-income equals setting, the HE component tends to
e overestimated by de facto incorporating the RWG term.
By pointing out that the “improper treatment of unequals” may
e a more serious problem associated with out-of-pocket pay-
ents than the “differential treatment of equals”, our results raise
n important question from a policy perspective, regarding the
e
m
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otential causes of such RR. In the context of developed coun-
ries a number of factors, in addition to the randomness incidence
f illness, were identiﬁed to be responsible for the presence of
eranking; e.g., variations in private insurance coverage against
ublic sector co-payments, variations in health services utiliza-
ion and institutional arrangements of public insurance systems
van Doorslaer et al., 1999). In the context of OPT – where no uni-
ersal insurance coverage exists, and where private insurance is
o far limited, the randomness of illness and the size of payments
nvolved seem to be the most likely factor behind such reranking.
et, another potential explanatory factor may be the variability in
ractical difﬁculties to access health care facilities according to dif-
erent locations and political realities (e.g., refugee camps, effects
f Israeli military occupation, etc.).
In addition, it must be noted that the current structure of
ut-of-pocket payments in the OPT is a rigid one, with gener-
lly no price-discrimination policies that may take into account
nter-households’ contributive capacities and no exemptions or
eduction in the amount of payments that may account for non-
ncome criteria, such as age, pregnancy and disablement. This is
specially the case of the private health care delivery sector, which
lays a non-negligible role in health care provision and ﬁnance:
bout 21.4% of total health care visits take place at private health
are institutions and result in 40.5% of total national health care
xpenditures (PCBS, 2006a). In this context, the relatively small
bserved variations in payments at each income level, as reﬂected
y both the pure horizontal inequity and the intra-group reranking
erms in our estimations, may be due to such rigid payment struc-
ure of out-of-pocket payments in the OPT, while the randomness
f illness remains the most probable source of this inequality. It
eems, therefore, evident to consider the “improper treatment of
nequals” as a more serious policy concern than the “differential
reatment of equals”.
Results on the overall inequality variation associated with
ealth insurance schemes – both the governmental and private
chemes – appear to be less conclusive: the two schemes appeared
o have marginal and statistically insigniﬁcant equalizing effects
n the income distribution. Results such as these seem to reﬂect,
n part, the relatively low shares of the public and private insur-
nce schemes in the overall ﬁnancing mix in the two Palestinian
egions. Some, though, is undoubtedly due to the fact that converge
s not universal, and hence, the RE associated with the insurance
chemes are likely to be driven by variations in coverage across
ifferent income groups. On the other hand, the substantial val-
es of HE and RWG observed in the case of GHI may be related to
he way premiums are established at each income level, resulting
romhouseholds of similar (equivalent) incomesmaking dissimilar
equivalent) contributions. In addition, the large observed values of
nter-group reranking (RBG) may also reﬂect the great diversity of
HI institutional arrangements and variations in coverage at each
ncome level in relation to the fact that GHI is compulsory for pub-
ic sector employees only, whereas it is of a voluntary nature for
thers.
Indeed, the governmental insurance scheme in the OPT involve
our different types of enrolments: the public sector employees are
ompulsory enrolled and pay a ﬁxed percentage (5%) of their basic
ncome up to a ceiling of 75 NIS; self-employed individuals and
age-earners can be voluntary enrolled by paying respectively a
onthly premium of 75 NIS and of 50 NIS, i.e. lump sum payment
egardless of individual incomes; the last category concerns the
xempted households, e.g., hardship cases, who are covered by the
inistry of social affairs with minimum premiums of 45 NIS being
aid on their behalf (Schoenbaumet al., 2005). On the other hand, a
ecent extensionofGHI coveragehasbeenachieved through the so-
alled “Al-Aqsa Intifada” insurance scheme,whichwas setupby the
ealth
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alestinian ministry of health following the current crises in 2000.
he Ministry has offered an almost “free of charge” coverage to
he mostly affected classes of population, and a very low-premium
nsurancewas later introduced to offer coverage for a high percent-
ge of uninsured households in the WB and GS.
It is well-known that introducing exemptions can enhance the
rogressivity of a ﬁnancing scheme to the extent that lower income
eciles are concerned (Wagstaff, 2002). Although the extension of
HI coverage under “Al-Aqsa Intifada insurance” was frequently
ecided on some income-related criteria, like the loss of jobs due
o the strict closure, as well as non-income-related criteria, like
isablement or injuries during the Second Palestinian Intifada, the
atest extension in coverage has randomly opened the enrolment
n GHI regardless of these criteria. Moreover, although the aim of
uch extension was to promote equity in the provision of publicly
nanced health care, the recent increase in the number of house-
olds entitled for public services through the “Al-Aqsa Intifada
nsurance” has not been associated with a parallel improvement
n the capacity of health services delivery. This has led to a fur-
her deterioration in the quality of care provided (MAS, 2000), a
igniﬁcant decrease in voluntary enrolment, and consequently in
HI total revenues (PMoH-MHIS, 2002; PCBS, 2004). Our results
trongly suggest that these unplanned evolutions have undoubt-
dly affected the magnitude of progressivity of GHI contributions
nd resulted in households on different incomes making dispro-
ortionate contributions and in households with relatively high
ncomes to contract out of this public insurance scheme. These evo-
utions have clearly limited the potential positive effects of such
nsurance scheme in protecting poor people from the impoverish-
ng effects of catastrophic health care payments and in reducing the
dverse impact of health care payment on the overall generalized
ncome inequality in the OPT.
Although the analysis undertaken in this study has tried to
eneﬁt from the latest methodological developments in the ﬁeld
f inequality measurement, some practical limitations that might
ave affected the study results are worth mentioning. Firstly, the
nalysiswas conducted using data from the recent national House-
oldHealth Expenditure Survey (PCBS, 2004). Although, household
xpenditure surveys are generally considered to be an adequate
ource of data for inequality analysis (Ravallion and Chen, 1997;
owell, 2000), our survey lacks information on health care expen-
itures paid through direct and indirect taxation. This is a clear
imitation knowing that the survey was originally designed to help
uild a system of National Health Accounts for the OPT, including
uch data would have offered the opportunity to assess the equity
mplications of overall health care ﬁnancing in the OPT. Secondly,
ata on “third-party ﬁnancial assistance” – other than private or
overnment insurance – are also missing or unreliable which is
lso a limitation since patients, especially those who are members
f poor households, may have received ﬁnancial aide from third-
arty (e.g., NGOs, charitable institutions, etc.) to help cover part of
heir health care costs.
Another serious limitation is the short recall period for which
payment source was recorded. This is the case for out-of-pocket
ayments, where data are based upon a one-month recall period
nd may be subjected to eventual biases due to stochastic and sea-
onal nature of illness. Annualising out-of-pocket payments in the
resence of such seasonalities, by multiplying with some scaling
actor,may lead to over- or under-estimation of total health expen-
itures. Although such practice is considered to be adequate for
istribution analysis of aggregates (e.g., deciles in the case of pro-
ressivity), it might not be reasonably adequate for an accurate
nalysis in the case of decomposition (van Doorslaer et al., 1999).
his might be avoided in future studies should health expenditure
nformation be collected over a longer period of time.
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However, in spite of this fact, a short recall period may help
educe the potential recall bias about health expenditures. Indeed,
n the present study, recall bias might not have been a major prob-
em. This is not only due to the relatively short reference period
onemonth)but alsodue to thedetailedmethodologyof the survey,
here respondents were asked about all different forms of health
xpenditures one by one. Compared to a scenariowhere the house-
olds are asked about the total sum of their health expenditures
ver a longer period of time, this detailed data collection method
ay have reduced the possibility that some items be neglected by
he households. Finally, it is worth noting that this direct measure
f health care expenditure ignores some important aspects, such as
aiting time, loss of productivity, quality of care and variations in
ariffs charged by different health care providers (e.g., public, pri-
ate for proﬁt, and private not for proﬁt health care), all of which
ay have a signiﬁcant impact on total expenditures (Juster and
tafford, 1991; Preker and langenbrunner, 2005).
. Conclusion
In spite of their limitations, the results presented in this paper
rovide a useful and detailed picture of the overall inequality vari-
tion associated with the current Palestinian health care ﬁnancing
tructure. Such results should help shape policy toward building
n equitable and efﬁcient health care ﬁnancing system for the OPT.
irstly, given the ﬁnding that out-of-pocket payments are associ-
ted with pronounced adverse effects on the already unbalanced
ncome distribution, an urgent need is there to identify innovative
nancing mechanisms capable to reduce the ﬁnancial burden of
ealth care expenditure and to limit the existing strong regres-
ivity in the system. Among the potential policy measures is a
eduction in the real cost of health care (e.g., medications and
ealth professionals’ tariffs). Indeed, in the current context, the
ost of medications and health professionals’ tariffs – especially
hose charged by specialists – absorb the biggest share of health
are expenditures (PCBS, 2004). Secondly, although the above
entioned policy shall enhance vertical equity in the system, it
ould not per se be able to signiﬁcantly reduce the considerable
mount of differential treatment (horizontal inequity and rerank-
ng), which was found to be the most important factor behind the
dverse effect of health care payments on households’ incomes.
t is well-established that the bulk of this differential treatment
s largely driven by the stochastic nature of illness and the size
f direct payment involved (Wagstaff, 2002). Therefore, a far big-
er reduction would only be possible through a shifting from
x-post-payments to ex-ante mode of ﬁnancing. This might be
ccomplished by introducing properly designed community-based
nsurance arrangements.
Although proven to be promising, the current structure of the
overnmental Health Insurance scheme needs to be reconsid-
red to further enhance its positive intrinsic capacities. Indeed,
his public insurance scheme, which includes various enrolment
rrangements, appears to have a considerable potential vertical
ffect when horizontal inequity and reranking are eliminated or
educed. Given that the sizable amount of such differential treat-
ent is associated with the current insurance arrangements, it
eems vital to reconsider the structure of insurance contributions
hat are associated with various enrolment arrangements. This
lso requires reconsidering the unplanned extension of insurance
overage through the so-called “Al-Aqsa Intifada insurance”. In
ddition, despite the fact that private health insurance schemes are
ar limited in the OPT and cater for a very small proportion of the
opulation, it was found that such ﬁnancing modality could still
lay a positive role in protecting households against the adverse
ffects of ex-post-payments, should enrolment’s premiumsbe suit-
1 ealth
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bly linked to households’ various abilities-to-pay (Pauly et al.,
006).
Finally, although this paper attempted to shed the light on the
ourcesof inequality associatedwith thecurrenthealth careﬁnanc-
ng arrangements in the OPT, a number of issues still call for further
esearch. Among these are the determinants of health care seeking
ehaviour in the OPT, not only the classical socioeconomic factors
ut also the political realities (i.e. locality types and regions), which
ight affect the horizontal inequity and reranking. This is germane
o the Palestinian situation where access to health care is highly
nﬂuenced by Israeli measures of security (e.g., Separation Wall,
heckpoints, etc.). Another interesting area of research would be to
xamine the value-added of extending health insurance coverage
nd the possibility of making insurance available for poor people
ithout increasing inequalities.
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